A Tricky Gamble in the Afghan War Plan

NATO's evolving strategy in Afghanistan is a tricky gamble, new in a lot of ways, and a re-envisioning of old ideas as well. Will it work?

Primarily, General Petraeus wishes to dramatically increase the training of local forces in a plan similar to, but very distinct from, what the U.S. did in Iraq. The local forces will not be tribal militias but will be interlocked special police units which are needed anyway. The main change is that NATO forces will focus on enhancing local police first, rather than waiting on the central army to be ready.

This is the closest NATO and Kabul have gotten to satisfying all the different sides: Shifting responsibility to local forces who have ownership over security in their own communities where the army may not, potentially reducing NATO's need for large offensive operations which can go awry, and hiring vast numbers of men at decent wages paid by the Afghan government which may reduce their willingness to rebel.

This is an attempt to satisfy all sides except, of course, al Qaeda and the most extreme members of the Taliban rebels, who expressed recently how they plan to torture and kill any woman attempting to earn income in their territory, among other calls for the de-humanization of their communities. And, although in the belief of this writer it is probably the least bad strategy attempted so far by NATO and should have been pursued countrywide much earlier, it does also have a huge chance of backfiring.

First, who wants what out of this war? Afghan people who are caught in the crossfire are likely hoping for relative freedom, justice for crimes committed, rule of law, participatory and supportive government, and the preservation of Muslim values. And though most probably wish for a moderate Afghan government, many men might prefer a harsh Taliban regime to something that may appear like a foreign puppet regime, as demonstrated by continuing consent for ultra-conservative leadership among men. The population very likely as a whole wishes for the least killing possible, and a fast end to this never-ending nightmare.

The Karzai regime appears to be willing to deal with moderate rebels as a means of pulling support away from the most extreme, incorrigible rebels, in a gambit to run a moderate regime which has NATO backing it up and helping it to begin to generate natural resource income. Arguably the Karzai regime has already seen so much killing they are solidly gliding down the love/hate channel U.S. defense partners tend to go in. That is, forgive the moderates and bring them into the fold, then attempt to kill the remaining extremists off once they're isolated. Of course, this is not only cold but unlikely to work; extremists will recruit from the survivors of mass casualty events and will run quasi-autonomous zones for years to come.

Meanwhile, the Taliban wants to turn the clock back to 2001, or rather 631 A.D, and the extreme members, including all of the leadership, don't mind who they kill along the way. And they promise to execute any women caught earning income or talking to members of the opposite gender outside the family in their areas, among other edicts. Their strategy is very likely to guilt conservative men into following them by invoking the name of God and by accusing Kabul as acting as an agent for foreign devils.

If the U.S. withdraws, the Taliban could split into two camps. One group would stop fighting because it opposed foremost a NATO occupation or the idea of a puppet regime which would feed the country's wealth abroad. But the other group, without NATO stopping them, would likely rally new recruits and accelerate the war against the Karzai government. Ironically, without NATO in Afghanistan with its heavy weapons, one potentiality is that a NATO withdrawal would lead to a dramatic increase in civilian casualties as the Taliban fights a more even match against Kabul. And if they win, they will certainly execute Karzai officials, force any of the female elite to flee for their lives, and open up an embassy and staging facility for their friends, al Qaeda, who will attack the West again.

The peacebuilders, peaceniks, and human rights advocates of the world who want to see a rapid end to bloodshed and a removal of foreign troops from Afghanistan may find that if the early elements of their wish come true — the authentic de-colonization of Afghanistan and a removal of the NATO occupation and their heavy weapons - that a bigger nightmare might follow if that withdrawal is not done perfectly — the Taliban increasing its war, killing more civilians and locking up more women along the way, if not toppling the government.

Some claim that Karzai, his ultra-conservative allies, and the moderate Taliban he would let in are just as bad. This is simply not logical comparing the cold acts of fighters on the government's side with the expressed governing priority of the rebel side. For every rape by the men of a Karzai ally which the Taliban might prevent better than Karzai, there will be a woman lynched in the square simply for talking in public or not permitted to seek justice for her rape because she does not have four male witnesses to the act, which is required in Sharia law.

Even if NATO leaders agreed with all points made by the peace and human rights community, which some of them do, they have come to a logical estimation that more Afghan civilians may die in a Taliban-Karzai war after NATO pulls out quickly, than during the slow time it takes for NATO to beef up Karzai's forces to sustainably resist an incorrigible rebellion.

Although few are saying so openly, this writer did get background opinions by experts that the realistic end to this war is akin to what's happening in Colombia. A Western-backed strong conservative will attempt to protect the elite and Western interests while the narco-trafficking murder-kidnapper gang which claims to represent the marginalized holds onto a quasi-autonomous region in the mountains for decades.

At the very least, the evolving strategy is genuinely putting more security power in the hands of Afghans themselves. Only time will tell if they serve well, obliged to the government for their paychecks, and eventually facilitate a fully-enforced rule of law which not only prioritizes democracy and justice but also prevents religious fanatics from murdering and torturing people for enjoying their new freedoms.

As for this writer, I'm in the cautious wing of the peacenik camp seeking a rapid end to all fighting, especially heavy weapon offensives by NATO which so often catch civilians in the crossfire. But having had colleagues killed by terrorist bombings overseas, worked in Afghanistan, and seeing how truly dangerous it could be to have the Taliban more evenly matched against Karzai, I fear a worse, bloodier war after NATO's early withdrawal, not like Iraq 2008, but more like Afghanistan 1994. And as before women and children will bear not only the heaviest costs of the war, but also of the post-war.

Photo credit: ISAF Media