Can a "Rights" Violation Be Ethically Acceptable, Even Required?

Note: This guest post by Alex is helping to make my day of departure from LA less crazed, so thanks go to him for submitting it. I'll be packing and traveling much of the day and unable to moderate much, so I ask in advance that commenters remain respectful of one another if buttons are pushed here. Edit: I just realized also that this is the second horse post in a row. That wasn't intentional; sorry for not spreading these out. -S. Ernst

Some time ago, I had an online encounter with several animal advocates committed to the theory of animal rights proffered by Gary Francione, a brilliant and influential proponent of ethical veganism. I accept many of Professor Francione's arguments. However, oftentimes, some of his enthusiasts over-commit themselves to certain conclusions that aren't necessarily founded in Francione's own reasoning. The following is an example.

Below, I'm using a hypothetical for clarity's sake. However, the aforementioned dispute involved the situation of a horse named Rivet, who was being used in a program designed to provide a therapeutic outlet for the mentally handicapped and the abused. Rivet was being used as such because of the exceedingly high costs associated with his care; he was effectively working for his living.

The alternative would involve either selling him or giving him away to someone, which would move the burden of his care, etc. to another person. The results are unclear as to what would happen to Rivet then, given his age and temperament. Horse slaughter or "euthanasia" are the most used options for horses who are no longer usable for their "purpose." Alternatively, Rivet's current person will find a way to let him retire as he's earned it. His person could also lease him specifically to be ridden. You pay to ride; however, riding can have physical consequences for the horse. Horse rescues are inundated with needy animals, as are sanctuaries, and these are the only places that can be trusted to really take the animals' interests seriously. The decision was made to allow Rivet to be used in the therapeutic program. The reasoning was straightforward consequentialism.

When this situation was discussed in the online forum, a criticism was leveled against Rivet's person for "violating his rights." The following is an attempt to flush-out this argument to see if it has real merit.

In a situation where four horses could be saved from slaughter or use by non-animal advocates, and all the suffering therein, but this rescue can only, pragmatically, be made possible at the expense of continuing to use these animals as things - not him, her, or a (moral) person - is using these animals as such in keeping with "animal rights" objectives? For this hypothetical, imagine that these horses are to be used three times a week as "therapeutic tools" in an equestrian therapy program, to include activities where the horse is led by the human participants through various skill problems.

Suffering has been reduced - and four animals have been allowed to continue existing and experiencing in a controlled environment governed by "animal rights" proponents. However, a rights violation will necessarily occur several times a week, as long as they are capable, because these horses will be forced to participate; they have no choice in the matter.

The first issue is an empirical matter. Has suffering actually been reduced? It seems unreasonable to argue that, objectively, suffering hasn't been reduced by stopping the transportation and unregulated use or slaughter (or other means of "disposing" of these animals). Assuming that the animals are only handled for use in the program, this situation is less harmful than the alternative. We can address the problem presented by the rights violation then.

Given that domesticated animals exist in something approaching concert with human animals, we can address this problem teleologically. We've grown and evolved together. Therefore, these kinds of interactions between human and nonhuman animals may be fulfilling for both parties. It's an example of nonhuman animals existing and participating with their human counterparts. If "rights" protect interests, most fundamentally the interest in not being harmed, then there may not be a rights problem to begin with. This kind of reasoning is deeply problematic logically, however (see Hume's Law).

A more promising response is suggested by moral discourse itself. Is it the concept - "rights" - that concerns us, or do we aim for some other end? Isn't morality about reducing the suffering experienced by sentient beings, or increasing happiness? If so, then simply as the result of the dominant justice paradigm in which we exist, rights aren't the end but the most effective means to an end. And that end involves improving the welfare of sentient beings.

If, therefore, it is not rights qua rights that are of primary moral concern, but improving the welfare of sentient beings (through a defense of "rights"), then our hypothetical isn't problematic (assuming that the empirical matter is settled). A rights violation is occurring. However, our ultimate end - reducing suffering and increasing happiness (that's a tautology) - is being realized. Despite the rights problem then, we are doing, objectively, the right thing by using these four horses as "therapeutic tools."

A good criticism of this line of reasoning might take the form of a question. Does considering improvements to the welfare of individual beings to be of paramount moral concern further calcify the animals-as-things paradigm, and if so, are we moving away from realizing our ultimate end, ultimately, by not effectively challenging these underlying assumptions? This is a difficult problem. It seemingly forgets the four individual horses who will suffer terribly and perhaps be killed if the action using them as a means to human ends isn't taken.