Daily Darfur: Where's the Goodwill?

"The historical narrative of the Darfur genocide is presently being re-written. Despite dozens of human rights reports that have established the basic realities of ethnically-targeted human destruction in Darfur and Eastern Chad over the past seven years, an effort is being made to minimise the scale of that destruction, elide the role of ethnicity in the conflict and downplay the responsibility of the Khartoum regime."

--- Eric Reeves, "Whitewashing Darfur"

A Qatari embassy official posted an op-ed in the Sudan Tribune arguing that brokering a ceasefire between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) is a futile effort, but that peace negotiations should proceed with an eye towards "the whole peace process." Ibrahim Ali Ibrahim states that such a process should include an "extension of the Goodwill Agreement" signed between the two parties in February, and "ask the two parties to refrain from certain hostile activities."

While I agree that "cease-fire agreements are weak, vulnerable and tend to fail and collapse immediately," it's difficult to imagine peace negotiations continuing with any strength while both parties are paying more attention to fighting each other on the battlefield. Likewise, also difficult to imagine how a goodwill agreement would actually contain any commitment to goodwill while conflict still rages.

Considering that the signed goodwill agreement collapsed spectacularly shortly after signed, how is that a better route to go? If ceasefire agreements are too difficult to monitor, how is a goodwill agreement any easier? If hostilities continue....where's the goodwill?

(I also can't help but wonder if this was really written by a Qatari government official, given that that government of Qatar is itself leading the negotiations.....?)

Quickies

Michael has a great post on Humanitarian Relief on the recent kafuffle over whether or not four American aid agencies are being readmitted to Darfur. (Artfully weaving in reference to one of my favorite books.) The overall gist seems to be: How many ways can we bow to Khartoum?

Sudanese Presidential Adviser in-Charge of the Darfur file, Dr. Ghazi Salaheddin, met with the head of the UNAMID peacekeeping force in El Fasher, North Darfur.

An op-ed in the Nigerian Daily Trust has an interesting assessment of Bashir's strategy to keep his iron grip on power in Sudan, through upcoming presidential elections and the 2011 referendum for Southern independence:

"It surprises no one that President Omar Al-Bashir of the Sudan is perfecting a sit-tight bid with a rock-solid plan to contest the seat of the presidency in the general elections of his conflict-rocked country, billed for February, 2010. History is laden with innumerable instaances of leaders super-gluing, or attempting very desperately to superglue, tightly to power even if the existing imperatives of their entities necessitate otherwise.

They stop at nothing to muster every required strength to maintain the firmest possible grip of power until coup d'état, severe ill health, severe senility or death, or a popular revolution do them part."

Barry Malone, writing for the Reuters Blog, reflects on the recent AU conference on the ICC, as well as the current make-up of the court and its staff, and asks:

"Is the ICC unfair to Africa and could the warrant for Bashir compromise peace efforts in Darfur? Or is the fact that every case before the court comes from Africa simply a true reflection of the continent's problems?"

A group of activists sent a letter to US Envoy to Sudan Scott Gration, demanding a more coherent strategy on Darfur.