Did the Kimberley Process Fail in Zimbabwe?

If you've been following headlines in recent months, you already know that Zimbabwe has a problem with blood diamonds.  As if the country didn't have enough trouble already, the Marange fields in Chiadzwa, an area in eastern Zimbabwe, were found to be incredibly diamond-rich in 2006.  Marange is one of the biggest finds in recent memory, and possibly the largest source of alluvial diamonds in the world.

The fields were owned first by De Beers and then by another diamond company, but neither began large-scale operations.  It wasn't until desperate Zimbabweans took to the fields in the hopes of finding something that would allow them to feed their families that the scale of Marange's wealth was discovered.  As soon as it was, Mugabe's security forces wasted no time pushing the rural peasants off the land.  Between 2006 and 2008, thousands of people were arrested, beaten, tortured, or killed.  Human Rights Watch puts the number of murders at over 200.  Those responsible for the violence have profited handsomely; Minister of Mines Obert Mpofu recently went on a multi-million-dollar property-buying spree, and top military brass allied with Robert Mugabe are reportedly enjoying paydays in the millions.

Zimbabwe's newfound diamond wealth, and the violence surrounding it, thrust the Kimberley Process back into the spotlight for the first time since the end of the civil wars that led to its creation.  Given the reports of violence at the Marange fields, and the blaring headlines about Zimbabwe's blood diamonds, it's natural to look to the Kimberley Process (KP) -- the idea is to clean up diamond mining, right?  Well, not exactly.  KP was an admirable attempt to stop a specific problem:  conflict diamonds.  In the 1980s and 90s, rebel forces in Sierra Leone and Angola (among other countries) used revenue from diamonds mined in rebel-held territories to finance their activities, and thus to finance bloodshed.  Hence "blood diamond."  KP aimed to fix that issue by establishing a certification scheme that ensured diamonds entering the international market were not funding armed conflicts.  Whether the certification scheme is all that good at tracking blood diamonds is a topic for another day, but the scheme was decidedly not designed for situations like Zimbabwe's.  Nevertheless, many in the international human rights community expected the Kimberley Process to reprimand Zimbabwe by refusing to certify its diamonds.

After months of deliberation, clumsy attempts at reform, and the appointment of an "independent" monitor with disastrous results, the Kimberley Process green-lighted diamond exports from Zimbabwe in July 2010.  A US-based diamond trading group subsequently imposed its own ban, but sales of Zimbabwe's diamonds continue to willing buyers, many in Asia.  Human rights groups roundly criticized KP's approval of diamond sales, and it has taken some serious credibility hits as a result of its actions towards Zimbabwe.

The criticism is not without merit.  In particular, KP-appointed monitor Abbey Chikane thought it would be a good idea to meet with Zimbabwean human rights activist Farai Maguwu while state intelligence officers were present.  Maguwu was promptly arrested (surprise!) and now faces trial for "communicating falsehoods against the state."  If convicted, he could be jailed for 20 years.  Either Chikane is a dimwit, or he's a narc.  Either way, the Kimberley Process lost.

That said, trying to apply the Kimberley Process to Zimbabwe's situation is a bad idea for two reasons.  First, because as mentioned above, KP wasn't designed for this.  Zimbabwe has a transitional government in place, and so far has avoided the scourge of civil war.  The abuse of diamond revenues by Minister Mpofu and military henchmen is infuriating, but it's hardly uncommon in countries rich in natural resources, and it is not the same thing as a diamond-funded war.

Second, the remedies offered by the KP don't help Zimbabwe.  In a civil war, cutting off a rebel force's funding by banning diamond exports is a good idea.  But Zimbabwe badly needs funding.  Finance Minister Tendai Biti, who has impeccable credentials as a long-standing and influential member of the Movement for Democratic Change (led by Morgan Tsvangirai), has publicly called for the Kimberley Process to certify diamond sales from Zimbabwe to provide the state with a new source of revenue.

Biti is a smart man.  He knows that KP certification will not stop corrupt practices in diamond trading, and that the military, loyal to Robert Mugabe, will continue to line their pockets while Zimbabweans starve.  However, the alternative is worse.  His Finance Ministry has seen no share of the estimated $30 million made from diamond sales in Zimbabwe to date.  Without certification, that money will continue to pass the government by.  With certification, the government can oversee mining activities and take a share of the revenue, providing needed funds for Zimbabwe to rebuild its social services and infrastructure.  For Biti, the choice is clear.

The lesson for those concerned with the ethics of diamond production is also clear:  The Kimberley Process, whatever we may want it to be, is ill-equipped to handle situations like Zimbabwe's.  Either its mission must be explicitly expanded and its procedures reformed to match, or diamond trading companies must sit down again to create a new process designed to increase transparency and accountability in diamond mining outside the context of war.

Photo credit: Brian Harrington Spier