DRC: Policies for Peace, Installment Numero Uno

This will be the first in a series of posts (because it's too massive to address in just one) planned for this week that address the Question du Jour on the DRC: How do you end the conflict and bring peace and stability to a region torn by absurd levels of violence for decades on end?

The Council on Foreign Relations issued a report last week, Congo: Securing Peace, Sustaining Progress, by Anthony W. Gambino, that addresses the key challenges to achieving peace in the DRC, with special attention to the role of the U.S. in pursuing two critical imperatives:

1. Ending the rampant violence and insecurity in the east, which involves creating a disincentive for the continuation of the multiple rebellions, and
2. Promoting environmentally-friendly sustainable development.

This post focuses on two premises of the report's policy recommendations: The rationale for US involvement in the DRC, and the integral role of MONUC. Posts on imperatives #1 and #2 will follow shortly.

Rationale for US Action

As Gambino notes, the Bush administration recognizes the need for U.S. involvement in the DRC, and referred the the country as among a handful in African that are "critical to the continent's stability" in a recent budget presentation to Congress. The U.S. currently contributes between $125 - 150 million a year in bilateral assistance to the DRC, including humanitarian aid, and $300 million a year to MONUC. American assistance to various programs in the DRC totals over $2 billion over the last decade.

Beyond the compelling rationale of the enormous humanitarian disaster in the DRC, American strategic and financial interests are threatened by the ongoing conflict. The DRC is a large nation in the middle of Africa, bordering nine other countries, and thus has the potential to destabilise the entire Central Africa region. Additionally, American businesses are reinvesting in the DRC, particularly in the mining sector, which is threatened not only by general instability, but by militias intent on securing wealth for themselves.

Despite the compelling interest and significant financial assistance to the DRC, Gambino writes that the Bush administration "never developed a comprehensive strategy" to address the fundamental causes of insecurity in the east, but rather adheres reactive policy that responds to episodic crises: "Senior policymakers appear satisfied with a strategy to avert complete disaster and collapse, and to tolerate a growing large-scale humanitarian emergency."

Seems like a waste of time and money, doesn't it? Not that responding to humanitarian crises is a waste--it certainly isn't--but a reactive policy aimed at not letting the crisis get too bad will require a constant cycle of reactive measures and forgo substantial improvement to the overall security situation. On the other hand, a comprehensive approach that addresses the root causes of the conflict actually stands a change of instilling sustainable peace and stability. But such an approach requires a long-term policy vision, with the influx of substantial resources in the interest of eventual goal, which is something legislators can have some difficulty swallowing. (Or so I've found, in my experience.)

MONUC: Underappreciated, but Essential

MONUC peacekeepers have received a bit of a bad rap lately, with angry civilians turning on troops and aid workers for their inability offer protection against the rebel onslaught. (It's more than a little unfair--there's only so much an under-resourced force and staff can do in such a massive humanitarian crisis.) But, according to Gambino, as bad as the situation is in the eastern DRC, the presence of MONUC is the only thing preventing full state collapse. Given  the particularly deplorable condition of the military and police forces, MONUC carries out many functions typically reserved for national security forces.

However, MONUC is only deployed to protect major cities in the East, and is unable to offer much protection to civilians in rural areas, where the majority of the population lives. "Despite this shortcoming," Gambino argues, "MONUC's presence remains the single most important factor preventing the full collapse of state authority in the east."

(Though I have to wonder if this is still true, given the events of the last week--Gambino's report was released last week, which likely means that the bulk of it was drafted before the most recent upsurge in violence. Now, though a ceasefire appears to be holding, the rebels appear within reach of Goma, the capital of North Kivu province.)

Stay tuned for an overview of Gambino's recommendations on reforming the dysfunctional Congolese armed forces and quelling militia activity in the East.