Four Scenarios for Afghanistan's 2010 Elections

The United States and United Kingdom want Afghanistan's 2010 parliamentary elections canceled.

Diplomats from both countries are gripped with fears of another fraud-ridden and potentially bloody election day if voters go to the polls just as the American troop surge is getting underway.

These fears are well-founded, but there is more than one possible scenario for the 2010 elections. Here are the four I see as most likely, in ascending order of likelihood.

1) All in. The international community decides that upholding Afghanistan's constitution (or approximating that) is more important to long-term political reform than avoiding election day violence. In this scenario, a massive pre-election effort gets underway in January 2010 to prepare for elections sometime between May and August 2010. With Kai Eide gone, the new head of the UN Assistance Mission makes her or his first order of business rapidly scaling up from the Eide-era gutting of the Mission. Emphasis is placed on training Afghan poll workers, but also recruiting the largest and most quickly assembled international election assistance team in UN history. The international community pumps money and expertise into the Electoral Complaints Commission, and forces the government's hand in dismissing corrupt Independent Election Commission officials responsible for fraud during the 2009 presidential election. On election day, Afghan National Army (ANA) troops are sent to guard more vulnerable polling places than before. With NATO forces and the Taliban engaged in the heaviest fighting of the war so far, much of the south is unable to vote anyway. Dozens of polling stations are attacked throughout the country, and scores of people, including several candidates, die in suicide attacks. The voting itself is more fair than not, but still falls short of international standards. The people of Afghanistan are disgusted by the election day violence, but satisfied with the process and outcome of the elections, and the international community earns back some of the trust it lost in 2009. The small group of reformist parliamentarians gains a few members, and the new parliament, marginally cleaner than its predecessor, begins its work in earnest. Nevertheless, western pundits declare democratization in Afghanistan a fool's errand.

2) Hands off. The international community disengages from the process almost completely. The hand-writing is on the wall: there's going to be lots of fraud, and lots of violence, and there just isn't time or political will to thwart it, or even mitigate its effects. The Afghan government haphazardly goes ahead with the elections on its own, without reforming the IEC or sending enough ANA troops to guard polling places. There is little vetting of candidates, if any at all. Few people vote country-wide and virtually no one votes in the south or east. More than a hundred civilians die in a wave of bloody Taliban attacks on polling places. For the carnage, Afghans blame the Taliban and, to a lesser extent, the feckless government. The new parliament lacks popular legitimacy and many  of the reformers from the previous parliament were defrauded out of their seats, refused to run, or died campaigning. Western pundits declare democratization in Afghanistan a fool's errand.

3) Wait a while. The elections are delayed for a year. The US and UK pushed for the delay, but most of the NATO coalition opposed it, and leaks of  high-level arguments make ISAF look fragile and divided. At the same time, rumors of internationally-organized electoral conspiracies run wild in Afghanistan's cities and countryside, and the Afghan government, embarrassed by its inability to administer the elections alone, does nothing to refute them. A date for the next elections is set, but almost no one believes it. Meanwhile, no one really knows what to do with the 352 current parliamentarians. Their terms are officially over, but there's no one to replace them, so they remain in Kabul, complaining about their unpaid salaries, refusing to vacate their rented homes (the Afghan press covers this story in detail), and feeding an increasingly farcical political environment. The USAID and UN parliamentary assistance projects shut down temporarily for nothing but contract reasons, but their closing fuels rumors that there will be no new parliament, and that the  so-called election delay is actually an international and Karzai government coup to remove the legislature and concentrate power entirely in the presidential palace. Western pundits declare democratization in Afghanistan a fool's errand.

4) The "meh" scenario. The elections take place on schedule, or are only delayed for a few months, but the international community does not make a serious attempt to avoid the mistakes of previous elections. The ECC remains underresourced and is unable to establish enough offices throughout the country. Vetting is half-hearted and minimal. The IEC goes unreformed. Not enough ANA troops are sent to guard especially vulnerable polling stations and not enough female election workers are deployed to allow many women to vote. On election day, turnout is below thirty percent nationally, and the Taliban kill dozens of voters and election workers in suicide attacks. Bamiyan is once again the only province with mostly clean voting and high turnout. The day after the elections, the national mood is grim and resigned. Karzai declares a period of mourning for those killed. The new parliament begins its work with less popular support and less international assistance than its predecessor. Afghans blame the Taliban, the international community, and their own government --in that order-- but are more exhausted and disenchanted than viscerally outraged. No one expects much from the new crop of parliamentarians. Western pundits declare democratization in Afghanistan a fool's errand.

Not one of the aforementioned scenarios involves a completely fair or bloodless election. Such a thing is impossible in Afghanistan today, and will be for some time to come. That does not mean the punditocracy is correct, however. The first and the least likely scenario for the 2010 parliamentary elections is also the least disastrous all-around. I believe it is worth the money, political will, and risks it would require of the international community. Time is short and the clock is ticking.

[Photo: Fardin Waezi. (UNAMA)]