How Many Aid Workers Receive Security Trainings?

So far, it's been a brutal year for aid workers - over the past week, two have been killed in Somalia, and another two in Gaza, not counting the death of a civilian contractor driving a forklift for UNRWA.

Not that this should come as much of a surprise, given the number of fatal attacks against aid workers in 2008.  Last year, at least 89 aid workers were killed in Somalia (36), Afghanistan (33), Darfur (11), Chad (4), the DRC (2), Sri Lanka (2) and Pakistan (1). And, this is by no means a comprehensive list.

Which got me wondering - how many aid workers in these countries actually receive security trainings?

One might think that, before sending staff to, say, Afghanistan, an agency would ensure that they'd received at least a minimal amount of security training.

And one would be wrong.

In a completely and utterly unscientific poll, I emailed a number of friends who are either working - or had worked - for NGOs in Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan (and in particular Darfur), and West Bank / Gaza.

Almost none had received any security training before going overseas.  About half had received either training or a security briefing once they arrived in-country.   For instance:

- Afghanistan - Of five friends who have worked in Afghanistan, not a single one received a security training before arriving.  Two people received security courses while in Kabul.

- Sudan / Darfur - Of eight friends who have worked in Sudan / Darfur, only one had received a security training before going overseas.  Another person took an online staff safety course before she left.

Two people had security briefings on arrival, and two took security courses offered by other organizations after they were already in-country.  Another person wrote back to say that his agency had brought in security trainers for staff.

One friend who worked with a well-established NGO wrote that "staff safety measures [in Darfur] were woefully inadequate."  For instance:

"a. I was never given a radio, and you know how unreliable mobiles can be in Darfur.  At several points in time I was completely out of touch with anyone from [the NGO], because the phone network was down.

b. I cut myself quite badly at one point in the office [in Darfur] and needed bandaging.  I asked where the first aid kit was.  There didn't seem to be one.  At the guesthouse I found a first aid kit - stuffed full not of plasters and disinfectant, but of toilet paper and washing powder.

c. There were no proper locks on the doors of the rooms in the various guesthouses that I stayed in.  Makes you feel especially unsafe as a woman in a place where you know that violent break-ins to NGO guesthouses are quite commonplace.

d. While out driving [in Darfur], the three cars in our convoy became separated (this was just after we had run across a group of 200+ heavily armed militiamen who were holding a meeting by the side of the road...).  When I asked why the driver didn't just radio the other cars I was told that the radio was out of order.  When I asked how long it had been out of order I was told "months", which begs the question of why this hadn't been fixed...

e. Basic compound safety issues were left unaddressed (e.g. it would be easy to build a wall a bit higher so that it cannot very easily be jumped)."

- Gaza / West Bank and Somalia - my friend in Gaza / West Bank received a security briefing on arrival. One person who worked in Somalia wrote to say that she did not receive any training, while another person who works on Somalia with a different NGO said that his organization now requires that all staff (including national staff) receive security training.

If anything, these figures understate the problem.  All the friends I contacted were international staff - with a few exceptions, national staff receive even less security support.

There are incredible NGO security officers, both in the field and at headquarters, who do everything they possibly can to protect staff.  Yet there's a limited amount security officers can do without organization-wide support.

Granted, these places are inherently dangerous.  However, that doesn't excuse agencies from doing all they can to make sure their staff have proper training and support.

And all too often, organizations themselves fail to make security a priority.  It's easy for NGOs to offer occasional statements about staff security; requiring that all staff actually receive some sufficient level of training is something else again.  At the end of the day, it requires time, and money.

Time and money that are long, long overdue.  That, or perhaps all NGO presidents and CEOs should just spend a few months in Kabul, or Darfur.

[Aid worker helps to free a trapped vehicle in Darfur - Photo from The Guardian / ACT-Caritas]