More Arab-U.S. Policy Makers Conference: Israel and Palestine

The session on Israel and Palestine featured three very good speakers: Nadia Hijab, Daniel Levy, and Naseer Aruri. Between them, they laid out the scenarios, strategies and options for the various parties over the course of the next administration.

I first met Nadia Hijab at a national meeting of United for Peace and Justice. She was in a tough situation: the "take-no-prisoners" pro-Palestinian activists were doing thier best to split UFPJ down the middle between those willing to embrace extremist rhetoric, and those seeking broad left positions.

Daniel Levy is peace activist who served as the primary Israeli author of the Geneva Accords. Before then he was part of the israeli negotiating team at Taba in 2001. He serves on the board of J-Street, my favorite Jewish peace group of late. He is also editing Prospects for Peace, which makes him a fellow blogger.

The last speaker was Professor Naseer Aruri, who I've known for nearly twenty years - because his son was a schoomate of mine. Of course, he never remembers. Oh well! Aruri rounded up the bitter left end of this session, which wsa totally in character.

The Chair of the session was man universally respected and admired in the community, Dr. Peter Gubser, recently President of ANERA, the leading American charity for Palestinian refugees. I think the last time I saw him was when we were at the nearly deserted Orient House, then being occupied by Israeli police.

What follows is a summary of their main points. NCUSAR will be posting videos of the sessions, but they aren't up yet.

Hijab: The Zionist dream of 1897 became the Palestinian nightmare 1948. Only in 1988 did the Palestinians recognize a two state solution as a national goal, thirty years after the Naqba. Today, if you look at the Palestinian controlled areas in the West Bank, it resembles nothing more than scraps of flesh hanging off a skeleton. Over time,, as the Palestinians have moved towards the center, Israelis have shifted to the right. There was a moment at Taba in 2001 when an agreement was very close; but Sharon's election halted the process.

Right now we are a low point in which prospects for a negotiated two state solution look dismal, and this has led to calls for reframing the struggle as being for equal rights. (What some call the one state solution.) But this apparent weakness still leaves Israel with serious dilemmas. Although it controls the land and has the strongest military, there are four weaknesses it cannot overcome:

1. The settler movement is too strong to be controlled; it has positions in the army, and attacks soldiers and israeli civilians.
2. The legal situation is untenable with regards to international law.
3. Israel's moral situation is untenable. Many are starting to use the word apartheid, including Israelis. The dire situation in Gaza arouses moral outrage.
4. The Israelis have weakened the Palestinian leadership - which is bad for Israel. A two state solution requires a compromse on the Right of Return. How can this be done without a strong leadership?

Levy: The two state solution paradigm is nearing it's sell by date, which will likely occur during the next administration. The crisis is not only how to bring about a solution, but a recognition that any kind of solution might be lost for another whole generation. Folks should check out the report prepared by the Palestine Strategy Group. It's an exercise in strategic planning that lays out the sitation quite well, from an overall Palestinian perspective.

The failure of the peace process(es) is not about the individuals involved. It's structural:

• Resolving issues cannot be done bilaterally, so pushing Israelis and Palestinians to just talk with each other does not work.
• You can't construct 2 state solution on the edifice of a divided palestinian house.
• You cannot incubate Palestinian statehood in a laboratory of hostile foriegn occupation. This is especially the case when you've set up a situation where the settlers have freedome of movement at the direct expense of Palestinian freedom of movement.

There is a dillema when you create or strengthen a Palestinian security force. Do they get to protect thier own people against Israelis, military or settlers? If not, then they are subcontractors for Israel with no legitimacy to enforce internal security. This is what we should do:

• Go comprehensive and regional. Support 2002 Arab initiative. Greater Arab involvement.
• US and quartet make bridging proposals on the specifics.
• Do not veto, but rather encourage Palestinian national reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah.
• Support the presence of international forces to provide security between the departure of Israeli troops and the strengthening of Palestinian security and governance infrastructure.

Don't assume that nothing is possible if Netanyahu wins the israeli elections,

He closed with a word of support for Rashik Khalidi, who came under attack because of a friendship with Obama. Khalidi is a decent man. Supporting Israel does not equal demonizing Palestinians and thier leaders. This does no favor to Israel.

(I want to cover Professor Aruri - but have to run! Next time. See more about him here: http://tari.org/)