Notes from a Dangerous Place: Broken in Iraq

This piece was written by a friend who has spent the past few years working for NGOs in Iraq.

After a spat of antagonizing banter one afternoon last winter while on my bi-monthly R&R from working in Iraq, my sister commented that I was “broken”. It was a natural younger brother teasing older sister act despite the fact that we are both adults and seemingly the younger brother still had a bit of maturing to do.

Well, after close to two years in Iraq and over five years of experience in development work, I am coming to the conclusion that besides me being possibly personally broken; the development profession and all that it stands for is severely broken.

The good intentioned objectives and goals of development work are often pushed aside by unreasonable time-frames and statistically oriented results required by donors and more so by domestic politics needing justification for the spending of tax payer money.

In addition, the implementing partners that are trusted with government and donor funds focus more of their attention on spending the money rather than ensuring that programs and their projects are implemented to have meaningful impact.

This is due to the system in place between the donors (more specifically US government donor agencies; USAID, Dept. of State, Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance, etc.) and the implementers which requires the funds earmarked for the program to be spent in order for the “profit” to be reimbursed.

It is not profit in the traditional business sense, but rather profit masked as overhead and which allows implementing partners to rent fancy offices, hire high salaried executives and lobbyists to ensure that the system continues to funnel funds to these organizations which have been aptly nicknamed, Beltway Bandits.

Directors and Managers in the field are unfortunately forced to cut corners to implement programs without necessary training of local hires and setting up the necessary checks to ensure that donor funds are reaching the intended beneficiaries.

In hostile environments this is further complicated when implicit trust is needed in local national hires to implement projects which are rarely ever seen by the expatriate managers or the donor agencies. Though pictures are worth a thousand words, they are often not conclusive enough and mislead the interested parties. Required documentation is often forged and/or is in a foreign language which neither the implementing organization and/or the donor agency can read and verify.

During my tenure working in Iraq, I often attempted to mitigate potential fraud and waste, but was encouraged to concentrate on project implementation and meeting the necessary burn-rates, as any necessary changes would ultimately slow the program and not meet the donor’s objects and more so not meet the expenditure burn rate required by headquarters. This conundrum led to numerous sleepless nights, arguments with supervisors and ultimately frustration about the whole system.

These feelings and observations are not exactly new and have been expressed before in various degrees. What is troublesome is that discussions with donor agency employees who work for the US government show that they also recognize these shortfalls and express dismay in how to address the issues that face the system.

During a recent dinner reception for some staff at a Provincial Reconstruction Team, the conversation centered around the futility of development work in Iraq and how it is often grossly misdirected and used as a tool in local politics and to support relatively wealthy business men and sheiks and how it is not reaching the general public. Essentially, all agreed that this system is broken and that we all play our parts in order that we continue down our career paths.

A broken system does not mean that it is not fixable, but the needed change will have to come from the United States government and its donor agencies. Until they stop forcing unrealistic results in unrealistic time frames and until they begin to hold implementing organizations to a higher standard that requires more accountability, the system will continue to be exploited, no matter whether or not a director or manager wishes to do the right thing.

Ultimately the system will prevail and wrongs will outweigh the rights and my immaturity may end while the system's will continue.

[Photo of USAID briefing in Baghdad from Getty Images]