On Prior Existence and Sophistry: Nonexistence Not a Rights Violation

One common retort to the philosophy of animal rights tries to circumvent the logic by an appeal to what seems a priori to be correct. The line of reasoning runs as follows: If ethical veganism is adopted writ large, many billions of nonhuman animals will never exist because those institutional structures that currently function for the end of bringing these beings into the world will be systematically taken apart, as would the paradigm, speciesism, that grounds the justification for these processes. Therefore, ethical veganism has the facially paradoxical quality of being derived from a considered concern for animals (other than human) while seemingly aiming for the end of no longer having a world populated by these same beings. I would like to offer some remarks about this criticism.

Within animal rights discourses, rights are generally founded on interests. Therefore, it doesn't follow, logically, to defend the interests vis-à-vis "promoting rights" of beings that currently do not exist because the possession of interests presumes sentience, which in turn, is predicated on existence: X does not have an interest in existence - nor does she have a right to be born - because from her position of non-existence, there isn't a "she."

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The situation being assumed in this criticism of animal rights philosophy can be characterized as follows: An infinity of non-bodily beings are non-existing in a state of nothingness. However, each of these beings is aware of their state of non-existence (and its opposite, the state of existence) and desire to be born, like lining up outside of a concert (that's non-existence) and waiting to get in (that's existence). A variety of unstated assumptions would need healthy defenses for this position to be reasonable.

Stating the rather paradoxical but logical conclusion of this kind of defense of omnivorism - "sustainable" or otherwise - illuminates its strangeness. If we benefit a being by bringing her into existence, it follows that we harm that same being by ending her life and forcing her back into non-existence. We should, therefore, it would seem, on this line of reasoning, act to bring nonhuman animals into existence and adopt a strong policy of non-intervention, or go vegan.

Furthermore, from a position of ethical principles, we don't actually accept this illogic in everyday reasoning, for if we did, those who protected themselves during sex could be criticized for violating the rights of non-existent humans. (Presumably, human beings have rights?) Parity of reasoning, it seems, would demand procreation.

Non-existence is neutral: it is neither good nor bad.

Some may reject this conclusion because they premise a pre-existent state of being: souls, for example. For argument's sake then, let's assume that it's a sound assumption, and we can directly benefit (and harm) the not-yet-born in the way this argument implies (not indirectly through systematic environmental degradation, for example). Would it be morally acceptable to bring a human animal into this world knowing that she will suffer extreme physical pain, be immobilized, and live a drastically shortened life constrained from acting on her most innate desires? Our moral intuitions would respond emphatically, No! It isn't morally acceptable. Therefore, it is inconsistent, self-serving, and blatantly question-begging to argue that these same constraints don't equally apply to our considerations about whether or not we ought to "benefit" a non-existent cow by forcing two other cows to procreate.

It strongly follows, therefore, from this same premise, that eliminating the animals-as-things paradigm - the property status of nonhuman animals - is the right thing to do. For no matter how well I may be treated, if I am brought into this world for the sole purpose of being exploited as a means to your ends, my interests will never be given substantive consideration.

Furthermore, assuming the premise is sound, it seems to follow that a straightforward aggregation would determine right action in this matter. Since existence is a benefit, bringing as many beings as possible into this world ought to be the goal. Due to obvious practical constraints, shouldn't we then avoid wasting resources on large, overly consumptive mammals, for example, and use our efforts to ensure the procreation of small rodents and amphibians? It seems reasonable to argue that we could literally bring thousands of these nonhuman animals into existence for every 10 human animals, cows, or pigs. The harmful impact of ruminant farming on wild populations raises further questions to this effect. Predictably, the inevitable response will surround the quality of existence, resting on speciesist assumptions. However, that is quite beside the point: existence matters for the proponent of this argument, not the quality of existence.

This is sophistry, a method of argumentation - a facially confusing or loaded argument - that seems clever but is actually flawed or dishonest. Notably, the intent is deception, not honest discourse.