Protection, Trust and UNAMID in Darfur

“We need active forces, not UNAMID. They are a tourism army,” declared a leader of an internally displaced persons (IDP) camp in West Darfur. He expressed in these words the frustrations of many Darfuris whom I met during a recent week spent travelling in Darfur. Another former state minister complained that the United Nations/African Union peacekeeping force (UNAMID) was “only good at writing reports in their air-conditioned offices.” With news that violence was flaring in the Jebel Marra area of Darfur and that UNAMID lacked the full authority to investigate the reports of civilian causalities and mass displacement there, these complaints certainly resonated.

Such blame, while understandable, should not be directed at those courageously serving or leading UNAMID.  The Sudanese government and Darfuri rebel movements continue to prevent UNAMID from fully carrying out its mandate.  The UN Security Council sent UNAMID to keep a peace that did not exist – a common refrain from those associated with the mission. In practice, this reality means that UNAMID can only carry out its Chapter 7 mandate and other duties to protect civilians with the consent of the Sudanese government. Only after you have sat in a UNAMID convoy as it passed through a Sudanese Armed Forces checkpoint do you understand the inherent restrictions on the mission.

For citizens throughout Darfur, this arrangement means that daily security depends almost entirely on the local relationships between residents, UNAMID, and the controlling authorities in the area. In some places, such as the Zam Zam camp near El-Fasher, a certain amount of trust for various political reasons has evolved between the IDP leaders and the authorities. As such, UNAMID’s presence reinforces this trust and serves to support and extend security in the area. In many other camps though, the Sudanese government lacks any substantive relationship with camp residents and, therefore, UNAMID’s efforts are largely curtailed as they do not have the authority or resources to provide the full functions of local authorities. Such is also the case, of course, in rebel controlled areas where UNAMID is often prevented from establishing a permanent presence.

It is difficult for Darfuris to understand though why UNAMID at times can be rendered almost useless because of the decisions of Sudanese police and other security forces, as well as the rebel groups. The instances of UNAMID inaction during major clashes between the belligerents are equally, if not more, incomprehensible. How, Darfuris ask, is it acceptable for both the Sudanese government and the rebel movements to block UNAMID access to conflict areas? Yet, in his January report to the UN Security Council, the Secretary General reported 21 restrictions on freedom of movement: 6 by Government forces and 15 by non-government actors. The current fighting in Jebel Marra is the most recent and egregious example.

To his credit, the new Joint Special Representative Ibrahim Gambari has stated that securing firm commitments from the Sudanese government and rebel leaders to enhance security and protect civilians is one of his top priorities. Just last week, Sudan’s Second Vice President Ali Osman Taha met with Gambari and afterward stated, "We want to see UNAMID succeed as this is beneficial to the people of Sudan, and most importantly for the Darfurians.” Likewise, Gambari flew to Paris over the weekend and met with rebel leader Abdel Wahid al-Nur, who also pledged greater cooperation. Now is the time for the UN Security Council to support Gambari and UNAMID by pressuring the Sudanese government and individual rebel leaders to follow through with such commitments of enhanced security and civilian protection. With lives hanging in the balances in places like Jebel Marra, the United States and international community should not tolerate any obstructions from the parties.

The Sudanese government’s rhetoric of peace at the negotiations in Doha must also be questioned on account of its dismal failure to take the first steps of providing security to millions of Darfuris. With UNAMID’s assistance, local authorities could begin – even before the signing of a formal peace agreement – to engage communities and IDP camps to develop plans on how to tackle current issues and threats. Instead, the government’s complete abdication of this responsibility in many areas begs questions about its true priorities in Darfur. Unfortunately, UNAMID has little recourse to challenge this mentality. The international community, therefore, must demand more from the Sudanese government than mere “cooperation” with UNAMID; it must demand the government’s commitment to peace expressed daily in Doha manifest itself in direct steps to rebuild trust with its citizens in Darfur. It is only with this paradigm shift by the government that UNAMID can fully carry out its mandate and help restore peace and security in Darfur.

Photo credit: Mark Lotwis/Save Darfur Coalition