Rumbling On: Opportunity, Responsibility, and Another Defense of Activism

On Monday, Michael Kleinman responded to my response to his post on the value and impact of the Save Darfur advocacy movement. Earlier today, David Sullivan at the ENOUGH Project joined in.

Let the rumble continue.

I take serious issue with many of Michael's points, and as this blog has my (partial) name and (obscured) picture at the top, feel entitled to share why...point by point, blow by blow. Indulge me, and follow the jump.

First: Responsibility to Protect

I find the criticism of the name of the Save Darfur Coalition to an unfair characterization of the movement, similar to the three-year-old-poster issue discussed in the previous posts. Of course, we are not arrogant enough to think that we can "save" Darfur --- we recognize the complexity of the conflict, and know that no instant easy solution can deliver Darfur into peace and prosperity. It is, anyway you look at it, a long and twisted road ahead.

However, we also recognize our responsibility to protect those who cannot protect themselves. (Member states of the UN agree.) The victims of the conflict in Darfur are unarmed civilians, who are subjected to government bombing raids and Janjaweed militia attacks, not to mention systematic rape, displacement, and the denial of food and medical aid. How, exactly, are they supposed to "save themselves?"

Civilians in Darfur are caught in the crossfire of an increasingly complex rebel movement and government counterinsurgency methods that not only fail to differentiate between civilian and military installations, but purposefully and systematically target civilians. Would you have said that the victims of the Holocaust should save themselves? Or Rwanda? Cambodia? How is Darfur different?

Second: Save Darfur's Polices and Positions

Michael writes,

"The traditional humanitarian critique of Save Darfur and others is that they don't understand the reality of the situation on the ground.

For instance, both John Holmes and Michelle refer to incidents when Save Darfur overstated the number of people killed in the conflict.

Which might seem like a trivial point, except it gets at something deeper - if you don't understand the facts, even the most basic facts, it's hard to offer useful recommendations on how to end the slaughter."

I've repeatedly heard the same --- and singular --- criticism of Save Darfur, but still do not see the poster incident as sufficient evidence to accuse the organization of not understanding the facts on the ground. (And, one a side note, not everyone thinks the number was inflated --- or at least, it wasn't pulled out of thin air.) The Save Darfur Coalition and affiliated anti-genocide and human rights organizations do, in fact, have extensive contacts on the ground in Sudan. The information gathered by researchers and informants feeds into on-going analysis and policy recommendations by the organizations.

Additionally, the Save Darfur Coalition itself has never called for military intervention. The organization has demanded a UN force with a Chapter VII mandate, and supports the imposition of a no-fly zone to enforce an existing ban on offensive military flights over Darfur, but these are a far cry from an argument for direct military intervention.

Third: Causes vs. Consequences

Michael does make the irrefutable point that the situation on the ground could get worse, and states, "Any call for action must be weighed against the possible consequences on the ground."

I would add that any call for inaction must be similarly considered. Khartoum's violence against civilians in Darfur is emboldened by impunity --- thus far, no actor in the international community has mustered substantial enough political will to pressure Khartoum to end its attacks, and left to its own devices, the regime continues its onslaught. While violence is not at the peak levels seen in 2003 - 2005, it is on the rise. If recent events are any indication, they stand to get far worse, with or without additional outside provocation.

In his post today, David makes an excellent point about the tendency of politicians to manage the symptoms rather than address the causes of conflict:

"Like it or not, governments and other political actors effectively deputize humanitarians to be the chief consequence managers of ongoing atrocities in places like Darfur. I have nothing but respect for those aid workers on the frontlines around the world delivering emergency aid and fostering recovery from armed conflict, but we need to recognize that sometimes policymakers cloak themselves in the warm glow of providing humanitarian aid as an excuse for not undertaking the hard diplomacy needed to end conflicts. As my colleague John Norris notes, at one point during the Bosnian conflict a resident of Sarajevo complained of the international community, ‘They just want to make sure we are well fed when we are shot.'"

Similarly, Eric Reeves writes:

"The other element of international response to genocide in Darfur has been to deploy a vast humanitarian aid operation---without protection---into an environment that has grown increasingly insecure."

This is not a criticism of the aid workers themselves --- their work is beyond noble, and the fact that they remain operational under such difficult conditions is beyond impressive. But rather than criticizing advocates for exerting pressure for conflict resolution, shouldn't that frustration be channeled towards politicians and governments that hide behind the good work and sacrifices of aid workers while offering no protection and proposing no efforts to actually improve the situation on the ground?

Fourth, and Final: This is Not Out of Our Reach

David said it best:

"So when Michael suggests that neither the U.S. nor Europe has the leverage to bring peace to Darfur, I wonder how he's come to such a conclusion. Nobody knows exactly how much leverage the United States, Europe, or any combination of governments may have against Khartoum and the Darfur rebels, because there has been no consistent effort to use that leverage and lead a viable peace process, such as that which helped to resolve Sudan's North-South civil war."

In fact, unlike Michael's assertion that Sudan's two decade civil war "only ended when both sides realized they had nothing to gain by continuing to fight," peace negotiations faltered for a decade until the United States made a serious investment in the process. Writing Monday for the Huffington Post, Ambassador John Danforth, President Bush's Special Envoy for Peace in Sudan, commented,

"I am proud of the U.S. role in the brokering the CPA. The U.S. was a catalyst, engaging the warring parties and other concerned countries in finding solutions."

In testimony before the Senate Banking Committee, ENOUGH co-founder John Prendergast cites four past examples of successful international pressure against Khartoum, arguing:

"The preponderance of evidence shows that during the 18 years of its military rule, the regime in Khartoum has only responded to focused international and regional pressure. Four times the regime has reversed its position on a major policy issue, and each of those four times the change resulted from intensive diplomacy backed by serious pressure – two ingredients not consistently applied in the response to Darfur today."

So what's the point?

All of this is a long way of saying this: Conflict is not like the weather --- it is not unchangeable, and it is not unstoppable. Conflict scenarios are comprised of the choices of individuals, and like any others, those individuals (even in their groupings) are subject to influence and points of leverage. It might be excessively complicated, but resolution is not impossible.

The U.S. and other international actors do have means of influence and points of leverage at their disposal. Whether or not they will be entirely successful remains to be seen, but we must at least try. And it is the job --- nay, the responsibility ---of advocates, in this country and abroad, to demand such action from our leadership.

I could go on, but will save it for the next round, and instead leave you with this quote from Dr. Martin Luther King's "Letter from a Birmingham Jail":

"Moreover, I am cognizant of the interrelatedness of all communities and states. I cannot sit idly by in Atlanta and not be concerned about what happens in Birmingham. Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere. We are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny. Whatever affects one directly, affects all indirectly."

Mr. Kleinman, I await your response.

[Photo from AP: Edwin Mutanguha, left, from Rwanda, passes a torch to his brother Edward Mutanguha, both freshman at Salve Regina University, on the steps of the Statehouse in Providence, R.I., during the symbolic 'Dream for Darfur Olympic Torch Relay', Saturday, Oct. 27, 2007. Rhode Island Darfur activists held the Providence leg of the torch relay which will happen in combination with 60 torch relays across the United States. A peace conference in Libya is part of an international effort to try to end over four years of fighting that have killed more than 200,000 people in Sudan's western region of Darfur.]