Speciesism: A Persistent Bane

A frequent participant in conversations on this blog--and the author of many of his own thought-provoking posts at That Vegan Girl--Alex Melonas responds this afternoon to some of the arguments that have been made in recent comment threads. Read on. -SE
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Assumed or otherwise, the challenge to animal rights most commonly implied (but never defended) is "Animals aren't humans." In its simplicity and egoistic appeal, this argument is particularly persuasive. However, when considered for just a moment, this "defense," if it can even be called that, is as illogical and poorly reasoned as it is facially, at least, uncomplicated.

One might respond somewhat facetiously as a means to illuminate the naiveté of this critic.

What an insight: Nonhuman animals aren't human animals. By definition, human animals are not nonhuman animals. Also, by definition, human animals aren't computers, aliens, or coffee cups either.

The assumption that this "insight" is predicated upon, however, is utterly baseless: Human animals aren't animals.

Here is the clever trick used by anti-animal rights individuals to disguise their massive error here: they remove the "animal" from "human." For this to be valid, however, some premises are required--a refutation of Darwinian evolution, for example.

In the end, then, the circular nature of this kind of reasoning goes to refute the argument. "Animals aren't humans, so different rules apply." I respond, "Actually, humans are, in fact, animals; therefore, by your own logic, whatever rules apply on account of a being's animal-ness necessarily must apply to you and me as well."

As a matter of ethics, however, this argument doesn't follow. What is being implied is the moral validity of a particular kind of biologism (not to be confused with "biological determinism"). The reasoning runs as follows: the ethical worth (or lack thereof) of a being is measured by its membership or non-membership in a particular biological group. Species membership, then, is imbued with ethical content--the biological dividing line dictates the ethical conclusion: nonhuman animals exist outside of our moral reasoning on account of their nonhuman animal status.

Two questions are begged from the outset.

What are the two questions? Read more after the jump.

Why is this kind of biologism ethically sound given that we reject other types of biologisms as axiomatic to ethical reasoning? Sexism divides the line at "sex"; racism finds the biological marker of ethical significance at "race." Logically, admitting of some complicated sociological factors, the argument of the most blatant sexist--that group membership in the male sex marks the ethical line of demarcation, which individuals should be considered "important"--is logically parallel to the argument that because nonhuman animals aren't members of the human species, their interests are of less or no ethical significance. In keeping with the common parlance, philosophers label this form of prejudice against individuals of a different species speciesism.

The second question that necessarily requires an answer is this: What makes human animals so special? The statement "Because we are human, and they aren't" assumes certain premises that go to justify this conclusion. These premises must be a defense of the special-ness of human animals, or, conversely, the non-special-ness of nonhuman animals, that captures all human beings while excluding all nonhuman beings.

It is commonly assumed, as the various comment threads on this blog display, that nonhuman animals have some ethical significance; however, given the minority status of vegans and vegetarians, this is rarely consistently applied. Defenders of the status quo defend two mutually exclusive propositions: (A) nonhuman animals should not unnecessarily suffer, and (B) it is ethically acceptable to kill nonhuman animals for food. The contradiction is inherent because (B) doesn't follow from (A) given that we exist in a society (I am admittedly being Western hemisphere-ist here) where nutritious food sources are abundant. Therefore, all killing for food, outside of the realm of the very rare, is an example of unnecessary suffering.

The reasoning of non-vegans either must assume a different set of ethical and logical rules grounded on speciesism, which begs the previously stated two questions, for this contradiction to somehow be made valid, or must confront this conclusion (rhetorical niceties and delusions aside--"I really do love and respect animals [other than human]"): the killing of nonhuman animals for gastronomical pleasure alone, with all the suffering therein, happens because we insist on it. And it is no more defensible than the unashamed racists who would, if given the power and means, disregard the interests of non-white human beings because of the biological fact of race.

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Image courtesy of the Empty Cages gallery.