The Dilemma of the U.S. Special Envoy
The US Special Envoy to Sudan, Major General Scott Gration, wants to test a new approach to the Government of Sudan (GoS) hoping to resolve the problems of Sudan, and Darfur in particular.
The new approach, since his appointment in March of this year, hinges on offering carrots with less or no sticks, i.e. rewards in advance hoping Government of Sudan will do the right thing, but with no actions in case GoS does not deliver on its promises. This approach, incentives-only, could be fruitful with any other government on the planet other than the government in Khartoum.
Nafi Ali Nafi, a powerful man of the regime, had stated clearly last month in AlGadaref (a city in eastern province in Sudan), that his party came to power "by force and will stay in power by force."
Last week for 2 days (Thursday September 10th and September 11th), I was with a delegation from San Francisco Bay Area Darfur Coalition (SFBADC) led by Martina Knee, Stephen McNeil, and Nickki Serapio visiting the U.S. Department of State and other Congressional offices in the Hill. The trip was to draw attention of Washington to the worsening situation in the internally displaced persons (IDP) camps in Darfur six months after the expulsion of 13 international NGOs from Darfur.
We met with the second person in the office of the Special Envoy to Sudan at the U.S. Department of State, Tim Shortly, for 2 hours. The discussion could be summarized in: The Special Envoy office sees the Special Envoy is working very hard, putting lots of mileage in travel to see the new approach bears fruits. We (SFBADC) tried patiently to point to the fact that the energy and activities of the Special Envoy have no positive on the ground in Darfur, and the facts from Darfur back our point of view.
On Sunday September 13th, IDPs received the Special Envoy with harsh and angry words on his visit to the IDP camp of AbuShouk in Darfur. The Special Envoy had a meeting with IDP representatives from 4 camps: Abu Shouk, Alsalam, Zamzam, and Kassab. The leaders of these camps told the Special Envoy that the Darfuri refugees see him as complicit with the government of Khartoum in prolonging their suffering in the camps. At the U.S. Department of State I mentioned to Tim Shortly that the IDPs in the camps and Darfuris at large have lost trust on the U.S. Special Envoy.
In a conflict like Darfur, trust invested in the U.S. Special Envoy is a crucial and a pivotal factor in resolving the root cause of the problem. In such complicated conflict, the final resolution is usually arrived at after crossing a series of interim sub-resolutions. Trust is the vehicle to transfer the adverse parties from one interim stage to the next one.
It is a mistake to keep feeding the government in Khartoum with more carrots while turning a blind eye to its atrocities in the IDP camps, Sudan-Airforce aerial bombing of villages, kidnappings, lack of basic essential supplies in the camps, and deterioration of security situation in the whole region of Darfur.
With Tim Shortly at the U.S. Department of State we have raised three urgent demands that are vital to the refugees in the camps. The IDPs at the camps in their meeting with General Geration coincidently have raised the same three points:
1- Security and Protection of the IDPs and Darfuris in Darfur.
2- Justice: Supporting ICC and arrest of those whom are wanted by the International Court.
3- Just and lasting peace (not the one now pursued per specifications of the Khartoum's government), that will lead at the end to the peaceful return of the IDPs in the camps in Darfur and the refugees in Eastern Chad to their homes and lands with security, compensation, and re-built villages.
General Gration is dealing with the government of Khartoum from a common-decency point of view. Yet since his appointment, kidnapping of humanitarian and UNAMID personnel has increased. Incidents of violence inside the camps have gone up.
The dilemma that the Special Envoy faces is that it might be too late for him to use any sticks to curb the appetite for violence of the government in Khartoum. With the U.S. carrots, Bashir's government is growing more belligerent and more emboldened to challenge the mission of the Special Envoy himself. The Government of Sudan now is sticking to the fraudulent census results and is, further, demanding changes in the referendum clause in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). This is a re-negotiation of already negotiated and signed 4 year old agreement.
There is a dead line (September 15th - Democratic Transformation laws inconsistent with CPA) that came and passed and only few took notice. So far to date, the Special Envoy has little or no progress to show regarding Darfur or Sudan situation. The carrots are turning the monster in Khartoum into a Frankenstein monster.
I believe that, in light of the Sudan Policy Review about to be released, Congress could do something to hold Bashir's regime accountable to its actions.
[Photo of Darfuri refugees in Chad from WikiCommons.]
COMMENTS (1)