UN Too Late Coming Out Against Militarization of Aid

From afar or from inside an armored humvee, marrying war-making and humanitarian aid seems to make a lot of sense. The NATO militaries have arguably the fastest logistics systems in the world. If one needs to deliver sacks of grain quickly, boom, it's there. Better yet, if NATO delivers more aid to frontline communities than their opponents, the undecided locals may choose NATO's side. In some cases, perhaps insurgents will trade in their weapons for jobs.

But there are huge, broader reasons to keep aid separate that are not apparent from afar or from inside an armored humvee. Finally, at long last, the UN is joining leading aid agencies in coming out stronger against this militarization of aid, for good reason.

The debate over the militarization of aid continues, even in the Pentagon and the U.S. Congress. Aid agencies remain in debate with each other over the trend. Here are the cases in brief. What do you think?

FOR THE MILITARIZATION OF AID

NATO forces, the Pentagon, the Bush Administration, Obama's National Security Council (though not necessarily all of the administration), security contractors, and aid agencies believe that the best way for NATO to win in places like Iraq and Afghanistan is to hit with simultaneous hate and love, a leverage system to deter those who oppose and attract those who are loyal. Love the civilians as long as they are not in the line of fire. And punish opponents with extreme prejudice.

With increases in aid to non-combatants and isolation of opponents, the group believes (largely because of a perceived-to-be-successful experiment in Anbar, Iraq) many less fanatical opponents may turn in their weapons for jobs and aid. Many "civil-military" believers doubt that there can be an "impartial" or "neutral" perspective in a war and that humanitarian aid should be aimed at those who do not oppose NATO, not to just anyone.

FOR THE SEPARATION OF AID AND MILITARY STRATEGY

Meanwhile, the UN, the International Committee of the Red Cross, human rights agencies and aid agencies point out that the militarization of aid is a violation of humanitarian law. Although it may seem just to have the apparent "defenders of democracy" monopolize the delivery of humanitarian and development aid in order to attract communities to their side in a conflict, the politicization of aid runs serious risks understood for decades by the writers and believers in the Geneva Conventions.

Soldiers delivering aid see smiling faces when they deliver aid, but their very observation alters the scene in ways they may have trouble envisioning. Many aid workers who travel -- without military escort -- in communities receiving aid from NATO witness those smiles turn to stammer and doubt as soon as the men with guns leave town.

Local community members witnessing the militarization of aid confess to international and local aid workers on the ground, often out of earshot of soldiers, that they fear that their use of the NATO aid product or service will make them a target of insurgents. They fear that NATO is not providing the aid for genuine partnership but a colonialistic gamble to trick them into submission, and, worse, they fear that if all aid programs from irrigation projects to schools become NATO projects, that no one in the community will be safe from reprisal attacks from insurgents anymore.

Perhaps the best covered indication of the serious risks of the civil-military partnership is the increased rate of attacks by insurgents on aid workers and their programs, forcing many good medical, agricultural, or developmental projects to be frozen, closed, or radically altered. But what's less obvious from the outside is the wisdom of locals who see this game as a deception reminiscent of the Soviet Union's huge school, reservoir, and power grid projects in the 1980s.

If people came to your house with weapons and, after searching and questioning you with their weapons raised, then told you that they were going to give you bags of food and a new school building, how would you react? Many aid workers and locals believe that the civil-military gains could be like the West's housing bubble. Quick gifts at gunpoint get quick smiles, but they don't necessarily create a long-term partnership.

Photo credit: U.S. Army